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CHRISTIAN COALITION: THE
EVOLVING UNITY OF THE
FUNDAMENTALIST RIGHT
OranP. Smith, Universityof South Carolina
The earliest studies into the voting behavior of religious people
classified religious voters very simply: Protestant, Catholic, Jew. This
simplistic understanding has given way in the last 35 years to much
more intense scrutiny of the differences within Protestantism,
Catholicism, and even Jewry at the ballot box. The most recent
analysis has broken down Protestantism further, sifting out the
differences between Main Line Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and
Fundamental ists in political behavior.
This article will attempt to take this progression in the literature
one step further. Instead of subdividing Protestantism into parts and
analyzing the distinctions, we will attempt to blend what we have
learned from the voting behavior literature with theories of interest
groups and social movements to subdivide a part of Protestantism, the
Fundamentalis t Right. 1 The location for our case study is what has
often been called "the buckle on the Bible belt," South Carolina.
As represented by Figure 1, when viewed as groups within the
Fundamental ist Right (or New Christian Right), three branches seem
to appear: the Separatist Branch of the Fundamentaijst Right, the
Movement Branch of the Fundamentalist Right, and the Emerging
Branch of the Fundamentalist Right. Within the Conservative Bloc, the
Separatist Branch, the Movement Branch, and the Emerging Branch
manifest distinct political behaviors. Bob Jones University, Jerry
Falwell, Pat Robertson, and the leadership of the Southern Baptist
Convention may not seem so different religiously and politically, but
all Fundame ntalist Republicans are not created equal.

The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support provided by the
Poundation for American Education in conducting this research.
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FIGURE 1
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The Separatist Fundamentalist Right
Members of the Separatist Fundamentalist Right are
Conservative in voting behavior but are just too committed to a
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religious movement to join a political movement. For them, historic
militant fundamentalism is the only Movement. In South Carolina, the
Bob Jones cell (the University community collectively and the
president, Bob Jones, III, grandson of the founder) is perhaps the best
example of this position. Sociologist Nancy Ammerman describes a
catagory similar to Separatist Fundamentalists . She returns to the
"churchly" vs. "sectarian" religious distinction developed in the late
1920s, writing that "churchly" Christians are "more accommodated to
the culture, in tune with the surroundings," while the "sectarian" are
'"in tension' with the larger culture, adopting practices and safeguards
that set them apart from the dominant tradition. "2 The Bob Jones
Republican of the Separatist Fundamentalist Right is "in tension" with
the culture. There is no socio-political "movement" and no movement
mentality except for the religious movement (Fundamentalism) that
launched Bob Jones University in 1927, two years after John Scopes
stood trial in Tennessee. During the halcyon days of the Moral
Majority movement, Jones, III explained to The Arizona Republic why
he refused to link up with Falwell: "I can unite only with those with
whom I agree. Christians should work within the framework of their
own beliefs toward social goals, without any ecumenism. "3
But Jones does not advocate cave dwelling. He strongly
supports Christian political involvement as long as no ecumenism is
involved. He told The Evening Press in Binghamton, New York that
"the so-called 'wall of separation' between church and state is a liberal
fabrication to try to put churches out of a place of influence in political
life. "4
The Jones position seems confusing at first, but his is a purely
separatist political understanding .
In his view 1) there are
Fundamentalist Christians and Non-Fundamentalist Christians, 2)
because they associate with Non-Fundamentalists , the Fundamentalist
circle does not include Falwell, Robertson or the SBC, and 3) political
organizations among Christians, just like religious ones, should be
doctrinally pure. Fundamentalists join only with fundamentalists
religiously; they may only join movements with other fundamentalists
politically. (After all, we must remember that BJU split with Billy
Graham over 40 years ago, not over what he preached, but over the
ministers with whom he associated in promoting his crusades.)
Volume 23 , 1995 \ 115
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The Movement Fundamentalist Right 5
The Movement Fundamentalist Right is the most vocal of the
New Christian Right and has been given the most ink in the last
decade. Much of the reason for this attention is due to the dramatic
shaking off of the theological and cultural impediments to political
organization, still at work in the Jones separatism. 6 Ending decades
of unwillingness to organize, various economic and social changes
turned these previously passive Christians into a potent political force
for the Republican party . Two cells , Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwe ll,
are the most influential examples of this branch.
Independent Baptist Jerry Falwell of Lynchburg, Virgini a
struggled with political activism. Because of the separatist mentality of
his Baptist Bible Fellowship (BBF) fellows, he resisted political
involvement for the first 20 years of his ministry . But when many
Catholic clerics but few Conservative Protestant pastors led the fight
against abortion in the immediate wake of Roe v. Wade, Falwell began
to question the part of his fundamentalist theology that kept preachers
out of secular politics . Seeing the priests in the streets, "for the first
time in my life I felt God leading me to join them," he wrote. 7 Seven
tumultuous years later, the Moral Majority had begun to fade as
Falwell changed its name to the Liberty Federation, turned the
organization over to one of his associates and returned to preaching at
Thomas Road Baptist Church and running Liberty University. (Because
of Falwell's limited impact in the Palmetto State, there will be little of
Falwell in the South Carolina case history to follow. But given his role
in some sectors, it would be inappropriate to exclude his organization
from this analysis entirely.)
Pat Robertson in some sense took up where Falwell left off,
starting an organization of his own coinciding closely with the demise
of the Moral Majority . Robertson's Freedom Council, which became
Americans for Robertson, and finally The Christian Coalition in
February, 1990 was more grassroots oriented, not being conten t with
grandstanding and direct mail like the Moral Majority. It seeks to build
an organization in every state and county in the country. This
mobilization, which began as early as 1985, came with the help of
preachers, but also of professional political consultants and staffers who
116 / The Journal of Political Science
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were veterans in the political arena.
Robertson began sounding the alarm for Christian political
involvement in his 1986 book America's Dates With Destiny.
Robertson wrote a chapter each on 23 historical dates, culminating with
a final chapter dedicated to the date "Election Day 1988." Robertson
encouraged Christians to be ready for that day by registering new
voters, studying and discussing political issues, and joining together
with other concerned Christians to become involved at the precinct and
primary level in a political party. 8

The Emerging Fundamentalist Right
The Emerging Fundamentalist Right, a group which includes the
Southern Baptist cell, are those Conservatives who are not secular, in
that they are Christian and Conservative , but seem to remain too
dominant in the culture to join a political movement.
Politically and theologically these "churchly" Christians (as
Ammerman would call them in contrast to the earlier "sectarian") are
much the same as other Conservatives, but are less prone to movements
because of their attachment to the culture. This stance is the mirror
image of the Separatist position. As the Separatist Fundamentalists are
driven away from joining hands with other Christians in a political
movement because they believe there is virtue in their distinctness , the
Emerging Fundamentalists refuse to join a political movement because
of their "worldliness."

Fundamental Distinctions:
The Separatist Fundamentalist Right in S.C. Politics
Bob Jones University Conservatives 1976-1994
As in the nation at large, the recent politics of the several
groups of the Fundamentalist Right in South Carolina is linked to
takeover attempts. 9 A large group associated with Bob Jones
University became active in the local politics of Greenville, South
Carolina, with much controversy in 1976. Though numerous BJU
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faculty and staff members had long been active as individuals in the
County Republican Party, that year a group of more militant BJU
politicos would make an attempt at capturing outright control. Many
seemed to have been energized by the opportunity to help gain
conservative Ronald Reagan the Republican nomination for president.
The BJU group and its allies took the sleepy Greenville County
GOP by storm in the hundred or so precinct meetings in the county,
ousting veteran pro-Gerald Ford moderate leaders in some precincts
and organizing precincts not heard from in decades. In a recent
interview, Gov. Carroll Campbell, then candidate for South Carolina
Senate, was quick to separate the militant BJU group from the older
Goldwater BJU group, saying that "there were precinct meetings where
they would talk theology for three or four hours. There were good
[BJU] people ... but there were [also] those who liked to fight
more ... "rn
The following is a tracking_ of the BJU campus vote for
1980-1994, tracing its maturity and voting patterns.
As Table 1 indicates, in 1980 Ronald Reagan was still the hero
of the Bob Jones Vote, winning 72 % to Connally's 17 % with only 11 %
for George Bush in that year's presidential preference primary. The
county gave Reagan only 60 % due to Connally and Bush faring a bit
better than in the BJU boxes. Statewide, Bush was significantly
stronger at 30 %, which held Reagan to 55 %.
After a dry period for Republican primaries came 1986. Now
veteran BJU-affiliated Conservatives were united behind a Campbell
gubernatorial bid, but not in the race for bis successor in Congress.
Dividing the fundamentalist camp for the first time were: two state
representatives friendly to Bob Jones who represented state house
districts near BJU in the house, (Reps. Rick Rigdon and Tom
Marchant), the mayor of Greenville (Bill Workman), and a hard right
newcomer (airline pilot Ted Adams). Marchant seemed to have the
Jones family endorsement, Adams was popular among BJU students
(who provided manpower), Workman had the support of many of the
veteran BJU Republicans, Rigdon had the rest. Rigdon, at 7 %, was
the least active of the candidates and though the lone BJU graduate,
was least popular with fellow alumni, partly because of bis newly found
charismatic faith. 11 The former John Birch Society member Adams,
118 / The Journal of Political Science
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TABLE 1.
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY PRECINCTS
REPUBLICAN PRIMARY VOTING
1980-1994
Campaign 1
1980 US President
County
Vote
3329
4429
14
11790
17
lll
40
11
19741

Percent
16.86%
22.44%
0.07%
59.72%
0.09%
0.56%
0.20%
0.06%
100.00%

Campai gn 2-A
1986 US Congress
County
BJU
Vote
Percent
Vote
42.60%
3113
325
Adami
27.79%
3033
Marchant 212
6.82%
52
1045
Ril(lon
22.80%
6236
Wortman 174
763 100.00% 13427
Tocal

Percent
23.18%
22.59%
7.78%
46.44%
100.00%

Campaign 2-B
1986 US Congress Runoff
County
BJU
Percent
Vote
Vote
431
60.03%
5659
Adami
Workman 287
39.97%
6644
Tocal
718 100.00% 12303
Campaign 3
1986 US Senate
BJU
County
Vote
Percent
Vote
Jordan
472
62.60%
6391
McMaster 282
37.40%
6568
TOl&I
754 100.00% 12959

BJU
Vote Percent
10.93%
179
BUib
16.62%
Comw)y 272
0.06%
1
Dole
71.72%
Jlea&UI 1174
0.06%
1
Staueo
0.31%
5
Baker
0.31%
Fernandu 5
0.00%
0
Belluso
1637 100.00%
Tocal

State
Vote
21569
43113
117
79549
150
773
171
59
145501

District
Vote
3504
3893
1371

Percent
14.82%
29.63%
0.08%
54.67%
0.10%
0.53%
0.12%
0.04%
100.00%

17267

Percent
20.29%
22.55%
7.94%
49.22%
100.00%

Percent
46.00%
54.00%
100.00%

District
Vote
6785
8399
15184

Percent
44.69%
55.31%
100.00%

Percent
49.32%
50.68%
100.00%

State
Vote
24164
27695
51859

Percent
46.60%
53.40%
100.00%

8499
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Campaign4
1988 US President
County
BJU
Vote
Vote
Percent
24.84% 12044
Bush
235
13.32%
5152
126
Dole
460
48 .63%
4262
Kemp
13.21%
5286
Robertson 125
0.00%
37
Dupont
0
0.00%
15
Haig
0
Stas.,en
0.00%
0
7
100.00% 26803
Tocal
946

Percent
44.94%
19.22%
15.90%
19.72%
0.14%
0.06%
0.03%
100.00%

State
Vote
94738
40265
22431
37261
316
177
104
195292

Percent
48.51%
20.62%
11.49%
19.08%
0.16%
0.09%
0.05%
100.00%

Campaign 5
1988 US Congress
BJU
County
Vote
Percent
Vote
42 .67%
367
7860
Adams
493
57 .33% 10513
White
100.00% 18373
Tocal
860

Percent
42.78%
57.22%
100.00%

District
Vote
11424
15096
26520

Percent
43 .08%
56.92%
100.00%

Campaign6
1990 SC Lt Governor
BJU
County
Vote
Percent
Vote
10.91%
3162
Martcbink 72
McMasta 588
89.09%
7331
Tocal
660 100.00% 10493

Percent
30.13%
69 .87%
100.00%

State
Vote
46598
49396
95994

Percent
48.54%
51.46%
100.00%

Campaign 7
1992 US President
County
BJU
Vote
Percent
Vote
47 .88%
5717
Buchanan 339
50.14% 11746
Bush
355
14
1.98%
882
Duke
100.00% 18345
Tocal
708

Percent
31.16%
64 .03%
4.81%
100.00%

State
Vote
38247
99558
10553
148358

Percent
25.78%
67.11%
7.11%
100.00%

Campaign 8-A
1994 SC Governor
BJU
County
Vote
Percent
Vote
Beasley
814
81.81% 17159
Hartnett
126
12.66%
6343
Ravenel
5.53%
55
4329
Tocal
995
100.00% 27831

Percent
61.65%
22 .79%
15.55%
100.00%

State
Vote
119724
52866
81129
253719

Percent
47 .19%
20.84%
31.98%
100.00%
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Campaign 8-B
1994 SC Governor Runoff
County
BJU
Percent
Vote
Vote
92.12% 19056
889
Beasley
7.88%
5089
76
Ravenel
965 100.00% 24145
Totll

Percent
78.92%
21.08%
100.00%

State
Vote
134038
98038
232076

?crccnt
57.76%
42.24%
100.00%

Campaign 9-A
1994 SC Lt Governor
County
BJU
Percent
Vote
Vote
36.64%
7606
Clybome 355
31.27%
5104
303
Jordan
32.09% 14858
311
Peela'
969 100.00% 27568
Totll

Percent
27.59%
18.51%
53.90%
100.00%

State
Vote
55870
65918
118562
240350

Percent
23.25%
27.43%
49.33%
100.00%

Campaign 9-B
1994 SC Lt Governor Runoff
County
BJU
Percent
Vote
Vote
63.32%
9016
599
Jordan
347
36.68% 14889
Peelet
946 100.00% 23905
Total

Percent
37.72%
62.28%
100.00%

State
Vote
89766
129923
219689

Percent
40.86%
59.14%
100.00%

Campaign 10-A
1994 SC Attorney General
County
BJU
Percent
Vote
Vote
33.15%
Condon
307
9775
46.00%
426
9594
Eckstrom
193
20.84%
Hamm
7037
Totll
926 100.00% 26406

Percent
37.02%
36.33%
26.65%
100.00%

State
Vote
103649
68819
66404
238872

Percent
43 .39%
28.81%
27.80%
100.00%

Campai gn 10-B
1994 SC Attorney General Runoff
BJU
County
Vote
Percent
Vote
Condon
292
31.43% 10590
Ecbll'Om
637
68.57% 12752
Total
929 100.00% 23342

Percent
45.37%
54.63%
100.00%

State
Vote
128798
92216
221014

Percent
58 .28%
41.72%
100.00%

Source: Data compiled by the author from SC Republican Party Records.
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however, received almost a majority of the campus vote (43 %), leaving
the mayor at 23 %. Countywide and districtwide the reverse was the
case, as Mayor Workman came within an eyelash of winning the
nomination outright with 49 % and Adams finishing last among the
active candidates with 20%. In the runoff, Workman was outdistanced
by Adams 60-40 at BJU, but won the nomination easily with 55 %.
The Republicans had another primary in 1986, an election to
find a candidate to face veteran Senator Ernest Hollings. BJU voted
even more like movement conservatives in this contest, giving
conservative Anderson , S. C. surgeon and political newcomer Henry
Jordan 63 % of its votes against former United States Attorney Henry
McMaster , who won the nomination handily with half of the county
vote and 53 % statewide. The race for Congress in 1986, in which the
BJU vote was divided, in some ways signaled a return to the more
individualistic politics of years prior to a Fundamentalist organization,
but the story of the U. S. Senate primary was all movement
conservatism .
BJU Republicans divided again in 1988, giving strong support
to Jack Kemp (49 %) and grudging support to George Bush (25 %) while
soundly resisting the claims of Pat Robertson . The rejection of
Robertson was so complete in the campus vote that it gave the
charismatic televangelist a lower percentage of the vote in its two
precincts than Robertson received statewide or countywide. In the
contest for Congress in 1988, however, BJU Republicans rejected their
conservative hero Ted Adams to support another moderate-conservative
city official , Councilman Knox White. White credited his primary
victory to the BJU shift .
The conservative pattern held in 1990 as Henry McMaster fared
better with the BJU vote. Running for Lieutenant Governor, McMaster
won 89 % of the campus vote and 70 % countywide to defeat moderate
(pro-choice) Charleston State Senator Sherry Martchink with 51 % of
the vote statewide. Two years later, Protestant incumbent president
George Bush edged out Roman Catholic columnist Pat Buchanan by
only 2 % to win the BJU boxes. Bush beat Buchanan much more
soundly statewide (67 % to 26 %). But indicating conservatism has its
limits, like Pat Robertson , former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David
Duke received less support in the Bob Jones community than
122 / The Journal of Political Science
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countywide or statewi de, as campus boxes gave David Duke only 2 %,
much lower than the county (5 %) or the state (7 %) percentage.
In the 1994 race for Governor , the Christian Coalition backed
David Beasley, a Southern Baptist lay preacher who was both a born
again Christi an and a born again Republican. Beasley had changed
lifestyles and parties in the four years leading up to the primary , having
served as Majority (Democratic ) Leader of the South Carolina House
and having never been elected as a Republican.
Professing a born
again experie nce based on hearing a Bible on tape distributed by a BJUaffiliated church, and unafraid to inject religion into the campaign ,
Beasley quickly endeared himself to the Bob Jones voters. Beasley
may have been the first Southern Baptist to "preach" at BJU for
decades. 12
Beasley's opponents were Charleston Congressman Arthur
Ravenel (one of the founders of the South Carolina Republican Party,
who had a confus ing position on abortion and was openly hostile to the
Christian Coalit ion) and former Congressman Tommy Hartnett , who
had been defeated narrowly two years earlier by Ernest Hollings for the
U.S. Senate. In the heat of the campaign , Hartnett , a Roman Catholic ,
complained to his diocese newspaper that he had met with Bob Jones
leaders who told him that they would support Beasley because he had
been born again. 13 Ravenel would base his two-week runoff campaign
against Beasley on his Coalition connection.
BJU gave Beasley strong support, 82 % in the primary and an
incredible 92 % in the runoff , the latter outpacing the level of support
for Ronald Reagan. Though not by the 8-1 and 9-1 BJU margin,
Beasley also performed well countywide in the primary and the runoff
(62% and 79% respectively) and the state (47% and 58%) .
The contest for Lieutenant Governor presented a tougher choice
for the maturi ng BJU vote . Howell Clyborne , a member of the S.C.
House from Greenville County, who represented much of the BJU
community in the state legislature , faced Bob Peeler, the owner of an
upstate dairy business (whose clever milk commercials made him a
household name), and the movement conservative, Christian Coalitionbacked Henry Jordan. In the first race, BJU voters cast the most votes
for the local represe ntative with the movement conservative finishing
last and the dairyman in between . Peeler won the county and state .
Volume 23, 1995 \ 123
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In the second race, with favorite son Clyborne eliminated , the campus
vote switched to the conservative, giving Jordan almost 2/3 of the vote.
But countywide and statewide dairyman Peeler won by nearly the same
ratio.
In the Attorney General 's race , the contest was similar to the It.
governor's race in that a perceived Christian Coalition candidate won
enough votes to advance to the runoff only to be soundly defeated
there. Lexington County (Midlands) school board member David
Eckstrom , the endorsed candidate, vied with former Charleston
Solicitor (Prosecutor) Charles Condon and the state Consumer Affairs
Advocate, Steve Hamm , also of the Midlands. Though no liberal,
Hamm was perceived to be the least conservative of the three. The
Roman Catholic Condon won a plurality of the state and county with
percentages near 40 % but finished second to Fundamentalist Eckstrom
among Bob Jones voters 46%-33%. In the runoff, BJU again gave
Eckstrom more votes (69 %), but Condon won the state 58%.
The significance of 1994 for Separatist politics was that for the
first time BJU gave a candidate running a movement-backed campaign
(David Beasley) its overwhelming support. But the campaign presented
a contrast in that local ties seemed to come into play for the first time
as well in the case of the lieutenant governor's race.

Fundamental Distinctions:
The Movement Fundamentalist Right in S. C. Politics
Pat Robertson Conservatives 1987-1994
In spite of Lee Atwater's boast to sweep South Carolina for
George Bush in 1988, the Pat Robertson organization sprang into action
early in 1987. Hundreds of Fundamentalist Christians, primarily
members of charismatic or Pentecostal churches, dominated the 1987
state party reorganization, taking control of numerous precincts, several
counties, at least one congressional district organization, and two state
house seats.
But the play for control of the state organization was turned
back when the Robertson choice for state party chairman, Van Hipp of
Spartanburg, was elected but refused to endorse Robertson, which
124 \ The Journal of Political Science
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was followed by a devastating South Carolina Republican primary
defeat, 48 % for Bush to 19 % for Robertson.
Following Robertson's defeat in the Presidential primary, the
Robertson organization became dormant for a time. Incumbent Rep.
Alva Humphries (R-Richland) was defeated for the Republican
nomination to his house seat during this slump. But in 1992, through
the national leadership of the newly formed Christian Coalition
(directed by seasoned Republican operative Ralph Reed), the S. C.
Robertson effort became the S. C. chapter of the Christian Coalition.
One of the first projects of the S.C. chapter was the distribution of the
"Christian Coalition Voter Guide '92." Almost 200,000 were
distributed in the Fourth Congressional District alone, featuring a
national issues survey comparing Bush, Clinton and Perot on one side
and South Carolina U.S. Senate and congressional district candidates
on the reverse. When candidates refused to respond, "positions of
candidates were verified or determined using voting records and/or
public statements. " The campaign was most damaging to Fourth
Congressional District incumbent Liz Patterson of Spartanburg, who
was defeated by Christian Coalition-backed Greenville attorney Bob
Inglis 50.4% to 47.4 %.
Nineteen ninety-three was another active year for Combs and the
Coalition as they endorsed the victor in the contest for leader of the
state party, conservative former U.S. Attorney Henry McMaster of
Columbia. Conservatives split, however, as moderate-conservative
Greenville County Republican Chairman Knox White received the
strong support of the BJU community. 14
As for 1994, the Coalition agenda was all David Beasley. At
the state Republican Convention over a year before the primary , those
identifying with the Christian Coalition were already supporting the
ex-state representative at a rate of 62 %, though other Republicans rated
him in a three-way tie for second place behind Undecided at 17 %. 15
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Fundamental Distinctions:
The Emerging Fundamentalist Right in S. C. Politics
Southern Baptist Conservatives
Because of their dominating numbers, the story of Southern
Baptists in South Carolina is little different from the story of white
Southerners in general-a wholesale shift from solid Democratic to
solid Republican.
But until a short time ago, progressive,
Democrat-leaners and Independents were in firm control of the state
Baptist organization. That is no longer true. Moderate former South
Carolina Baptist Convention president Flynn Harrell thinks some of it
has to do with politics: "The fundamentalists have won four elections
in a row in the state. I'm a Democrat, so I'm not comfortable with the
right wing in the convention ... " 16
The research of James Guth agrees , showing the growing
strength of the Fundamentalist Right among ever more Fundamentalist
Southern Baptist ministers . 17 As for the SBC rank and file , a poll of
South Carolina citizens conducted in 1994 by the Institute of Public
Affairs at the University of South Carolina 18 indicates that 36% of
those calling themselves "Southern Baptists" identified themselves as
Strong Republicans, indicating a very present conservative element
within the SBC in South Carolina.
A second poll , conducted by First Impressions, Inc. 19 with
questions added by the author , reveals another dimension of the
Southern Baptist vote. Table 3 shows that in spite of the fact that
David Beasley was the Christian Coalition candidate , interviewed
Southern Bapti sts chose him over two Republican challengers at a rate
of 66 % (percentages in the table total left to right). Beasley told the
author that he thought once the word got out beyond the SBC state
leadership that his' denominational choice was Southern Baptist, his
active Southern Baptist faith began to have an impact because of the
large number of Southern Baptists in the state. 20
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TABLE 2.
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
NATIONAL POLmcs
(South Carolina)

Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Ind Leaning Democrat
Indepe ndent
Ind Leaning Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican

SBC Baptist Protestant Catholic
4%
16%
9%
6%
15%
8%
9%
11%
0%
7%
9%
5%
11% 15%
15%
21%
14%
5% 11%
6%
19% 18%
19%
6%
36% 27%
29%
23%
25

N=

228

236

48

Source: 1994 Policy Survey
Institu te of Public Affairs, University of South Carolina

TABLE 3.
SC REPUBLICAN PRIMARY, 1994
DENOMINATION BY SUPPORT
FOR CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR

Baptist
Methodi st
Presbyte rian
Episcopalian
Lutheran
Catholic

Beasley
69 66%
21 55%
19 49%
1 7%
3 23%
5 22%

Hartnett
3 3%
3 8%

8 20%
3 20%
1 8%
9 39%

Ravenel
33 31%
14 37%
12 31%
11 73%
9 69%
9 39%

Total Sample:
Baptist
196 40%
Methodist
79 16%
Presbyteri an
63 13%
Episco palian
22 4%
Lutheran
26 5%
Catholic
34 7%
Other
73 15%
Source: First Impressions Research
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The Real Christian Coalition: 1994 As Watershed Year
It has been the purpose of this work to illustrate fundamentalist
diversity, or to show, in the words of Governor Campbell, '"Christians
in politics' isn't monolithic."
Bob Jones University fundamentalist Christians, the most
religiously separatist in the spectrum, stormed Greenville in 1976. But
BJU voters cast their lot with local state Representative Howell
Clyborne for lieutenant governor in 1994, leaving movement
conservative Jordan last of three. The coziness of this new found
regularization seems to work against a Christian political movement
mentality from the opposite direction of the old separatist influences
that still keep BJU from cooperating with ecumenical conservative
political movements. Now a part of the power structure, BJU
Republicans have a second reason to oppose the Christian Coalition.
Pat Robertson Conservatives, by contrast, over six years after
their first foray into South Carolina Republican politics, remain
outsiders, not regarded by regulars as "real" Republicans who are
committed to the GOP for the long term but as zealots sworn to enact
a short term Robertson-Reed agenda. Moreover, as ugly as the 1987
run on the state GOP was, it did not prevent a second takeover move
in 1993. Governor Campbell said it best, that the Coalition goal seems
to be "takeover. .. not long term governance. "21 When compared with
Bob Jones, this presents what could be called The Paradox of
Fundamentalist Politics, i.e., BJU Fundamentalists are much more
religiously separatist in politics than the Coalition, being reluctant to
join a Christian political movement, but the BJU group seems to blend
with "regular Republicans " much better than Robertson 's forces.
Southern Baptists seem to manifest characteristics which are a
mirror image of the BJU group, not too separatist to join a Christian
political movement, but too contented and dominant in the culture to
"stoop" to support such activities. According to one local political
observer, Southern Baptists in South Carolina "are getting politically
active now, not in an organized movement, but on their own. Before
[1994], the politically active Christians were almost exclusively the
independents,
the fringe,
and the non-denominational
fundamentalists. "22
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But though BJU, the SBC and the Christian Coalition are
diverse and possess a very different history , there was no disagreement
on a candidate for governor in 1994. Why? First, David Beasley was
the perfect candidate for the BJU vote . He was a Christian , a
Protestant, and not a charismatic. He was openly endorsed by the
"regulars." He won almost nine out of ten BJU votes. The Robertson
organization liked him too. His style appealed to them as well as his
willingness to return their telephone calls. Active in Southern Baptist
denominational affairs and lay preaching in Southern Baptist Churches,
the emergent conservatives in the SBC saw him as one of them and
spread the word informally.
The story of 1994 is that for the first time since these groups
became politically aware (since the rise of Falwell and Robertson, the
post-1976 maturing of the BJU vote, and the SBC conservative takeover
in S.C.), Fundamentalist Conservatives from Separatist Fundamentalist
Right to Emerging Fundamentalist Right were on the same team- a true
Christian Coalition . But this was an odd coalition, a silent one that no
one seemed to control , not even the Beasley campaign. The partners
barely knew each other , and in the case of some, that' s the way they
wanted it.
This seminal unity allowed Mr. Beasley a great deal of latitude
in dealing with criticism. Beasley risked the endorsement and active
support of the Christian Coalition , never making excuses for their work
on his behalf. He took this risk because he knew that for the first time
there was so much unity among so many Conservative Christians in
Carolina (BJU , SBC, CC and the Conservative Bloc--Figure 1). In the
final analysis he would win the Republican nomination not necessarily
because of the support of the Christian Coalition, but because of the
reaction of Conservative Christians (perhaps many of which were
teetering Southern Baptists) to the attack on "Christians" by the other
side. The Beasley strategy worked.
Perhaps Beasley's campaign knew (returning to the First
Impressions poll) even though 40 % of the likely primary electorate was
mainline (Table 5), 60% went to church every week (Table 4) and 40%
of the state was Baptist (Table 3). When attacked by Hartnett and
Ravenel in the primary campaign and Theodore in the general election,
Beasley said his strategy was to ask "'why they were attacking
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TABl.ll4 .
SC REPUBLICANPRIMARY,1994
OIURCH ATIBNDANCEBY SUPPORT

FOR CANDIDATESFOR GOVERNOR
Beasley

Hartnell

Ravenel

Every Week 102 61%
Alm llvry Week 21 43%
Few Tll!le&/Ycar 7 28%

13 8%
10 20%
3 12%
3 18%
113%

5231%
1837%
15 60'll,
1059%
450%

Seldom

4 24%
3 38%

Never
Tol8I

Sample:

Every Weck
288 60'll>
Alm llvry Week 88 19%
Few Tunes / Year 50 11%

Seldom

38 8%
II 2%

Never

Sowcc : Fint Impressions Research

TABl.ll5 .
SC REPUBLICANPRIMARY,1994
RELIGIOUSDESCRIPTION
BY SUPPORTFOR CANDIDATESFOR GOVERNOR

Fundamentalist
Evangelical
Charismatic
Main Line
Something Else
Total Sample:
Fundamentalist
Evangelical
Charismatic
Main Line
Something Else

Beasley
31 66%

Hartnell

22 67%
9 75%
43 41%
27 47%

1 3%
0 0%
1817%
814%

3 6%

Ravenel
1328%
1030%
3 25%

4542%
2340%

7115% 22%
49 11% 15%
19 4% 6%
184 40% 57%
137 30% -

Source: First Impressions Research

TABl.ll6 .
SC REPUBLICANPRIMARY,1994
SUPPORTFOR CANDIDATESFOR GOVERNOR
BY RELIGIOUSDESCRIPTION

Fllndamcntalist
Evangelical
Charismatic
Main Line
Something Else

Beasley

Hartnett

Raveocl

3123%
2217%
9 7%
4333%
27 20%

310%
1 3%
0 0%
18 60'll>
827%

1314%
1011%
3 3%
4548%
2324%

Sowcc : First Impressions Research
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Chris tians' .. . that they were Christian-bashing. "23 In the process
Beasley won the regular church goers , the low church Protestant
denomina tions , and enough mainliners to win the primary. According
to Tables 5 and 6, though skewed to the right a bit , religiously
Beasley' s support was close to proportional with the primary electorate
(much more than Hartnett and roughly equal in proportion with
Ravene l).

Fundamentalist Politics: Nationalizing the S.C. Study
Moveme nt Membership Over Time
We have seen that though in voting they may agree more than
disagree of late , over ti.me there is a contrast from Bob Jone s to
Robertso n to Southern Baptists in eagerness for movement-style
activism . Figure 2 attempts to chart some of these differences . First ,
while BJU has remained Separatist for three decades, Robertson has
moved into the Movement Fundamentalist Right branch and though
flirting with the Movement Right, the SBC remains within the emerging
branch . BJU had a brief foray into activism as we have documented ,
but hassince returned to much less militant "regularized" involvement.
Robertso n appears and reappears over ti.me but has always been
activist. The new SBC elites have taken their rank and file on a march
toward greate r involvement, edging toward acti\'.ism since taking over
the Conve ntion in 1979, but there remains a divided focus due to
continuing internal strife . But again, Southern Baptists in South
Carolina so dominate the cultural landscape that there is little to cause
them to organize a movement to oppose a culture that they so greatly
influence numerically .2A
The lowering of tensions in local Republican politics is a
numbers game as well. At one time considered interlopers to dominant
moderate Republicans, the party has begun to embrace BJU since the
end of the Ford-Rockefeller era in 1977 and the shift to
Reagan-Bush -Gingrich Republicanism in the 1980s and 1990s. This
has not been the case with the Christian Coalition , which remains
militant, choosing for instance to resist the leadership of Henry
McMaster, Jack Kemp's 1988 state chairman and one of the most
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conservative statewide candidates in state history. But unlike BJU or
the SBC, due to the nature of the organization, an end to confrontation
might prove the end of the Christian Coalition. This is the nature of
the organization. The SBC and BJU, by contrast, have no political
organizational budgets to meet and can afford accommodation. The
Coalition, with a huge overhead, must keep the troops and contributors
at a fever pitch to keep the funds coming in. As for Southern Baptists,
a move toward a genuine organization and the Movement
Fundamentalist Right by the leadership (perhaps in a looming state
lottery fight) could possibly change the political complexion of the state
by energizing a large group of conservatives . But such an effort would
be a tightrope walk in a state Baptist convention still populated by a
number of Democrats :
nGURE2

SUMMAllYOF POLITICALCHARACTERISTICS
OF SC FUNDAMENTALIST
GROUPS BY CELL

BRANCH

BJU

ROBERTSON

SBC

SEPARATIST

MOVEMENT

EMERGING

NATIONAL
LOCAL

NATIONAL
MOD LOCAL

POLmCAL
ORGANIZATION LOCAL
LEADERSlllP

COOPERATIONIST MILITANT

MOVEMENT
IDENTIFICATION RELIGIOUS

RELIGIOUS
POLmCAL

COOPERATIONIST
RELIGIOUS
MODPOLmCAL
SOCIALJ

OTHER

MOVEMENTS

NONE

PERSONAL

CULTURAL

SEPARATISM

SOCIAL
RELIGIOUS

SOCIAL
RELIGIOUS

RELIGIOUS

AGENDAAGE

OLD

NEW

OLD/NEW

AGENDA
SPECIFICITY

GENERAL

SPECIFIC

SPECIFIC

AGENDA
CONTENT

MODERATE
CONSERVATIVE CONSERVATIVE CONSERVATIVE
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Organil.ations Local and National
More specifically , in comparing Fundamentalist political groups,
there is the question of national vs . local organization. BJU has never
had a national political organization but has had some level of local
organizatio n since 1976. Pat Robertson has been organizing on the
national and grassroots levels since preparations for his bid for elective
office in 1987 . The SBC began to use its Christian Life Commission
to serve a political function in 1990 and has recently begun a drive to
focus on similar state level commissions.
As for the future, BJU could at any time attempt to build a
genuine national grassroots organization with local chapters . They have
graduates in every state and vast media resources. But they have not
chosen to do so. The Southern Baptists seem poised for such a move.
For future political impact , the SBC seems the cell to watch .
In considering local and national organization, the role of
leadership seems crucial . This factor is predominant in the on-again ,
off-again Falwell interest in politics, and the shift of the SBC to the
right both nationally and in South Carolina. To many, leadership is the
main reason that the Christian Coalition has been well organized
nationally under Ralph Reed, but was overly personalized nationally by
Robertson and marginalized in South Carolina by Roberta Combs. As
for BJU, it could easily be surmised that after the 1976 takeover fiasco,
the Jones family sent out infonnal word that the University and its
mission was being hurt by these political activities and that they should
cease if conducted in so divisive a manner . Indeed , according to one
supporter of Ted Adams ' campaign for Congress in 1986, after the
1976 fiasco, there were attempts to impose some order by "operatives "
in the BJU administration . These efforts were derailed by the
Adams-Wor kman-Marchant split that year but have since taken hold .zs
To be extrapo lated nationally , strong leadership can often have as much
effect as religious and spciological factors in determining whether a
certain fundamentalist group will have a national organization , a local
grassroots organization , both, or neither, and whether that organization
will be cooperationi st or militant .26

Volume 23 , 1995 \ 133

Oran P. S,rzith
Competing Movements
In our South Carolina analysis we also uncovered the
phenomenon of competition from another movement. In the case of
BJU, we find there is no contest. Fundamentalism is the movement.
To BJU, soul winning (religion) will always overshadow secular
politics. By contrast, Pat Robertson finds himself equally active in both
movements: conservative politics and evangelism. Southern Baptists
have traditionally been a part of the revivalist "soul winning"
movement as well , but organized political activism among even
conservatives varies from congregation to congregation and from state
to state.
Given this scenario, those desiring to form a national
conservative Christian movement composed of dues-paying ,members
would be wise to work with Robertson first , Southern Baptists second,
and BJU last. BJU's energies will not be rechanneled, Robertson wants
to "have it both ways ," the SBC is at a crossroads in its political life.

Two Degrees of Separation
Important politically too are two kinds of "separation" we have
found: religious and social. BJU proves high in both categories. But
the SBC, dedicated to the public school system and public colleges, but
reluctant to join in ecumenical dialogue, is religiously separatist but
sociologically interactive.
Sociologically, Robertson is neither as
socially integrated as the SBC or as distant from mainstream culture as
BJU (though that call is difficult) . Religiously, Robertson has shown
less sectarianism in his programming at CBN and more willingness to
move out of his Pentecostal circle, though the flavor of "The 700 Club"
is decidedly Protestant and mostly Evangelical.
Nationally, the groups at the extremes attract our attention-the
Southern Baptists and BJU. We see the reasons here both for Southern
Baptists as Emerging Fundamentalist Right and BJU as Separatist
Fundamentalist Right to reject membership in the Movement
Fundamentalist Right. The nature of a social movement is protest or
a reclaiming of something lost, and neither has anything to protest or
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reclaim. One is on the cusp, remaining influential in political life but
becoming concerned, the other is resigned to focus on the next world.
Whose Agenda?
Because the BJU campus has had some regular political activity
since 1964, the age of the BJU political agenda is as old as the
post-World War II conservatism which merged anti-communism abroad
with reactionary social policies at home. 27 In comparison to the rest,
the Old Right leaders of BJU are more likely to continue to rail against
Universalism, Trilateralism, the Council on Foreign Relations, and for
a general overarchi ng cultural conservatism than to speak out against
more trendy neo-conservative targets like Outcome Based Education
(OBE). The other two conservative cells are new in comparison.
Robertson, the programmatic conservative, arrived in the 1980's with
an agenda of specific issues. The Southern Baptists are often just as
specific of late, but the SBC has a broader social concern by tradition.
The SBC, unlike BJU and Robertson, has since the founding of its
Christian Life Commission (CLC) almost 40 years ago, focused on
progressive issues like hunger , social justice and race. With the new
regime, the conservative agenda (including pro-life and other socially
conservative themes) has not pre-empted the old focus of the CLC, but
has been grafted on. Robertson and Jones have been slow to let any
progressive themes crowd their agenda (though perhaps a special
designation should be added to BJU in this regard).

Conclusions
As this article has attempted to show, and as Figures 1 and 2
summarize, there are three branches to the Fundamentalist Right in
America, each bringing a particular religious and sociological heritage
to politics.
With the stamina of the Southern Baptists, the
aggressiveness of Robertson and the consistency of BJU, each has its
own approach as well, causing each to fit the characteristics of the
Separatist Fundamentalist Right, the Movement Fundamentalist Right
or the Emerging Fundamentalist Right.
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In the 1920s H . L. Mencken wrote about the time of the Scopes
trial that if one were to toss an egg out of a Pullman railroad car
window almost anywhere in America, it would hit a fundamentalist.
That is not as true today, but as Randall Balmer wrote , "Pullman cars
are obsolete in America today. Fundamentalists are still around. "28
In fact, fundamentalists have awakened . In the turbulent decade of the
1960s Bob Jones was burying its founder, undertaking an expansion of
its new campus, and fighting with Billy Graham. Pat Robertson was
being ordained a Baptist minister and signing on the air with a
one-camera Christian television station .
The Southern Baptist
convention was in the middle of a growth spurt and focusing on
evangelism and church building. But as the l 960s came to· a close,
fundamentalists found themselves in a very different world from the
pristine past. By the mid-1970s, discontent with the changing culture
led to varying degrees of political involvement , which has been
magnified in the 1980s and 1990s. Robertson , Jones and the SBC have
little empires now , influencing in
various ways large groups of follower s, most of whom are now
registered to vote and are doing so.
The story of fundamentalist politics is not only that of religious
01ganizations becoming political or of moderate organizations shifting
starboard .
There is the notion of the spreading of the
political-fundamentalist message. Though we have looked closely at
only three groups, there are a number of others, not yet at the
emerging point , that vote like these groups but do not yet identify with
any branch of the Fundamentalist Right. Time will tell whether these
groups will be attracted and if the Fundamentalist Right is at its ·p~
or ready for another surge .

Oran P. Smith is writing a dissertation under the direction of Professor Earl
Black entitled "Baptist Republicanism . " He is an adjunct instructor in the
Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South
Carolina .
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